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PRESERVING THE ‘JEWEL OF
THEIR SOULS’: HOW NORTH
CAROLINA’S COMMON LAW
COULD SAVE CYBER-BULLYING
STATUTES
1

NICHOLAS MCGUIRE*
INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the North Carolina Supreme Court declared the State’s
cyber-bullying statute unconstitutional because it violated the First
Amendment right to free speech.2 The court held that North Carolina’s
content-based restriction on speech was not narrowly tailored to serve
the legitimate interest of protecting minors from online bullying.3
Punishment for speech is viewed unfavorably by Americans, largely
due to free speech’s important role in our nation’s history.4
Nonetheless, legislatures occasionally criminalize acts with a speech
component that are likely to threaten the social order and cause a
breach of the peace.5 One such act is cyber-bullying.6
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1. Good name in man and woman, dear my lord
Is the immediate jewel of their souls . . .
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3.
2. State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814 (N.C. 2016).
3. Id. at 822.
4. See, e.g., Richard Wike, Americans more tolerant of offensive speech than others in the
RES.
CTR.
(Oct.
12,
2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/factworld,
PEW
tank/2016/10/12/americans-more-tolerant-of-offensive-speech-than-others-in-the-world
(explaining the place of free speech in the Bill of Rights and current views in support of free
speech in the United States); Richard Wike, 5 ways Americans and Europeans are different, PEW
RES. CTR. (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/19/5-ways-americansand-europeans-are-different/ (comparing views on free speech between Germany and America,
with Americans being more tolerant of free speech).
5. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (explaining that content-based
restrictions are allowed in limited situations).
6. Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws, CYBERBULLYING RES.
CTR., (last updated Jan. 2016), https://cyberbullying.org/Bullying-and-Cyberbullying-Laws.pdf.
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Cyber-bullying, bullying that occurs online, has become a growing
problem in recent years, especially as much of adolescent social life has
transitioned to online communities through social media networks.7 No
longer is bullying confined to the stereotype of playground harassment
during the school day.
As with all societal and technological advances, the unforeseen
ramifications of online conduct warrant reconsidering how the legal
framework is equipped to deter such abuses. Cyber-bullying law is
currently in a state of flux, where scholars and practitioners must
consider a multitude of variables and adapt to the cyber-landscape’s
constant change.8
This Note examines North Carolina’s failed attempt to limit cyberbullying, starting with the enactment of a constitutionally flawed
criminal statute and the North Carolina Supreme Court decision that
ultimately invalidated it. Part I provides a brief overview of cyberbullying and the impetus for legislation across state governments. Part
II discusses the facts and the North Carolina Supreme Court’s analysis
in State v. Bishop. Part III proposes an alternative approach to address
cyber-bullying through the common law torts of libel and intentional
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Part IV argues that, given the
severe nature of the offense relative to today’s society, and the
ineffectiveness of assigning punitive damages to the parents of cyberbullies, cyber-bullying should warrant criminal liability. Finally, Part V
provides an example of a cyber-bullying statute that avoids the
constitutional pitfalls found in North Carolina’s original statute.
I. CYBER-BULLYING: AN OVERVIEW
Cyber-bullying has several definitions, none more straightforward
than “bullying that takes place using electronic technology.”9 All
definitions specify that the victim be a child, preteen, or teenager,10

7. Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying fact sheet: Identification,
RES.
CTR.
(Oct.
2014),
Prevention,
and
Response,
CYBERBULLYING
http://cyberbullying.org/ Cyberbullying _Identification_Prevention_Response.pdf. 95% of teens
in the United States are regularly online, and 74% access the internet on their mobile device. Id.
8. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ED., Key Policy Letters from the Education Secretary and
Deputy Secretary (Dec. 16, 2010), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/secletter/101215.html
(explaining continuing strategies and stakeholders for developing cyberbullying laws).
9. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Effects of Bullying (Sept. 12, 2017),
http://www.stopbullying.gov/at-risk/effects/.
10. See, e.g., What is Cyberbullying?, NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL,
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while most definitions state that the offender must also be a minor.11 If
adults become involved, the acts are often considered “cyberharassment” or “cyber-stalking.”12 This difference is grounded in the
common understanding of traditional bullying.13
Electronic technology includes devices such as cell phones,
computers, and tablets, as well as services like social media sites, text
messages, chat, and websites.14 As the technology landscape continues
to change, so too will the avenues for cyber-bullying.
The use of electronic technology distinguishes cyber-bullying from
bullying in many ways. Cyber-bullying can occur anywhere a victim has
access to the internet.15 This means that even a child’s home, the place
in which a child should feel most safe, becomes vulnerable. The abuse
of such technology also allows for cyber-bullies to say things that they
would not say in person,16 to reach an audience that they would not
reach in person,17 and even to hide behind anonymity.18 Unlike
traditional bullying, cyber-bullying can be inescapable, extending well
past the school day; as more of social life transitions to the internet, it
becomes increasingly difficult for children to simply “log off” to ignore
cyber-bullies.19
Cyber-bullying has severe and concerning effects on children.
Studies show that cyber-bullying victims experience significantly lower
levels of self-esteem, decreased academic performance, and increased
delinquent behavior.20 There is also a strong correlation between
http://www.ncpc.org/topics/cyberbullying/what-is-cyberbullying (last visited Oct. 12, 2017); What
is cyberbullying exactly? STOP CYBERBULLYING, http://www.stopcyberbullying.org
/what_is_cyberbullying_exactly.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).
11. See What is cyberbullying exactly?, supra note 10.
12. Id.
13. What is Bullying?, CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR., https://cyberbullying.org/what-isbullying (last visited Oct. 12, 2017) (“Bullying is any unwanted aggressive behavior(s) by another
youth or group of youths who are not siblings or current dating partners that involves an observed
or perceived power imbalance and is repeated multiple times or is highly likely to be repeated.
Bullying may inflict harm or distress on the targeted youth including physical, psychological,
social, or educational harm.”).
14. Cyber Bullying, SAFER TOMORROWS, https://www.safertomorrows.com/get-help/cyberbullying/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).
15. What is Cyberbullying?, supra note 10.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying research summary: Cyberbullying
RES.
CTR.
(2010),
http://cyberbullying.org/
and
Self-Esteem,
CYBERBULLYING
cyberbullying_and_self_esteem_research_fact_sheet.pdf; see also Naomi Harlin Goodno, How
Public Schools Can Constitutionally Halt Cyberbullying: A Model Cyberbullying Policy That
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experiencing cyber-bullying and increased levels of depression.21
Furthermore, cyber-bullying victims are just as likely as victims of
traditional bullying to have suicidal thoughts and actions.22
Similar to traditional bullying, many state legislatures have
authorized school boards to implement cyber-bullying policies to
regulate communication on school grounds or through technology
provided by the school.23 Although the Supreme Court has stated that
schools may prohibit on-campus speech that “might reasonably [lead]
school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material
interference with school activities”24 or that interferes “with the rights
of other students to be secure and to be let alone,”25 electronic
technology and the rise of social media has complicated the line
between on-campus speech and off-campus speech.26 The Supreme
Court has not addressed whether schools can regulate speech that
originates off campus but affects the environment on campus. As a
result, the lower courts are split as to whether schools can regulate offcampus speech, and if so, under what circumstances.27
Framing cyber-bullying as an educational issue has both its benefits
and disadvantages. Using the recognized power of public schools to
regulate on-campus speech grounds the issue in constitutional
authorization.28 However, the applicability of this power to cyberspeech that arises off-campus raises new First Amendment issues. Even
if the Court addresses these issues and holds that schools can regulate
off-campus speech, limiting the issue of cyber-bullying to the schools

Considers First Amendment, Due Process, And Fourth Amendment Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 641, 645 (2011).
21. Michele P. Hamm et al., Prevalence and Effect of Cyberbullying on Children and Young
People, 169 JAMA PEDIATR. 770–777 (2015).
22. Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Bullying, Cyberbullying, and Suicide, 14 ARCH.
SUICIDE RES. 206–221 (2010).
23. Cyberbullying research summary: Cyberbullying and Self-Esteem, supra note 20.
24. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
25. Id. at 508.
26. See Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students For Bashing Principals, Teachers &
Classmates In Cyberspace: The Speech Issue The Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 210, 213 (2009).
27. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015); Kowalski v. Berkeley
Cty. Schs. 652 F.3d 565, 537 (4th Cir. 2011); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d
Cir. 2011); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011); Doninger
v. Niehoff 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir.
2001).
28. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986);
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
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overlooks those children who are not enrolled in school and overlooks
the periods of time that school is not in session.
Congress and state legislatures have enacted or attempted to enact
criminal cyber-bullying legislation, many of which are named in honor
of cyber-bullying victims whom took their own lives.29 In 2009, the
North Carolina General Assembly addressed the effects of cyberbullying by passing House Bill 1261, also known as the Protect Our
Kids/Cyber Bullying Misdemeanor Act.30 The bill was codified into
Chapter 14 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which frames the
offense as a computer crime akin to damaging computers31 and
computer trespass.32 Under the statute, it is “unlawful for any person to
use a computer or computer network to . . . [p]ost or encourage others
to post on the Internet private, personal, or sexual information
pertaining to a minor” with “the intent to intimidate or torment a
minor.”33
II. STATE V. BISHOP: FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts of the Case
One morning in September 2011, Dillon Price received a Facebook
notification.34 Price, then a sophomore at Southern Alamance High
School in North Carolina, opened the Facebook application on his
phone to discover that several classmates had posted offensive and
vulgar comments and pictures of him.35 Unfortunately, these posts were
the first in a consistent stream of similar behavior from his classmates
that continued for months.36 Among the classmates was Robert Bishop,
who posted several vulgar and threatening comments about Price,
including a screenshot of a sexually themed text message that Price had
accidentally sent him.37 Many of the messages included comments and
accusations about Price’s sexual orientation, along with other namecalling and insults.38
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

State Cyberbullying Laws, supra note 6.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1 (2012).
Id. § 14-455.
Id. § 14-458.
Id. § 14-458.1(a)(1)(d).
State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 815 (N.C. 2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 816.
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The constant Facebook commentary eventually became
emotionally and physically overwhelming for Price. One night in
December 2011, Price’s mother found him crying, punching his pillow,
and physically harming himself.39 Price’s mother confiscated his phone,
discovered the Facebook comments, and subsequently contacted local
law enforcement.40
After conducting an undercover investigation, the Alamance
County Sherriff’s Office arrested Bishop and charged him with one
count of cyber-bullying under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–458.1(a)(1)(d).41
B. Lower Court Proceedings
At trial, the State introduced three exhibits as evidence—each a
separate screenshot of a Facebook post and its respective comments.42
The first exhibit consisted of a Facebook post that included both a
screenshot of a text message Price had accidentally sent to a classmate
and a series of over 30 comments from a variety of individuals in
reference to the screenshot.43 Among those comments were four from
Bishop: (1) “This is excessively homoerotic in nature. Exquisite
specimen;” (2) “Anyone who would be so defensive over Dillon can’t
be too intelligent;” (3) “And you are equally pathetic for taking the
internet so seriously;” and (4) “There isn’t a fight. We’re slamming
someone on the open forum that is the internet.”44
The second exhibit was another Facebook post containing a
screenshot of a text message conversation between Price and a
classmate.45 In the comment section, several classmates stated that they
hated Dillon.46 In response to a comment that said, “Can we just kick
his ass already,” Bishop replied, “I never got to slap him down before
Christmas break.”47
The third exhibit was another Facebook post containing a
screenshot of a text message conversation between Dillon and a
classmate.48 One of the text messages included a digitally-altered

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–458.1(a)(1)(d) (2012).
State v. Bishop, 774 S.E.2d 337, 341 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

MCGUIRE READY FOR ISSUE (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

PRESERVING THE ‘JEWEL OF THEIR SOULS’

2/5/2018 4:06 PM

63

picture of Dillon and his dog, prompting students to post vulgar and
derogatory comments in response.49 Bishop posted several comments,
including: “I heard that his anus was permanently stressed from having
awkwardly shaped penises in it” and that Dillon’s genitals were
“probably a triangle.”50
The court denied Bishop’s motion to dismiss, and he was eventually
convicted by a jury of one count of cyber-bullying.51 Bishop was
sentenced to four years supervised probation.52
Bishop appealed the conviction, arguing that the statute restricted
speech protected by the First Amendment; that this restriction was
content based; and that it swept too broadly to satisfy the demands of
strict scrutiny analysis.53 The North Carolina Court of Appeals
concluded that the statute did not regulate speech, but rather that it
“punishe[d] the act of posting or encouraging another to post on the
Internet with the intent to intimidate or torment” a minor.54
C. North Carolina Supreme Court Ruling
On August 20, 2015, the North Carolina Supreme Court granted
Bishop’s petition for discretionary review.55 When considering the
constitutionality of the statute, the court determined that: (1) the
statute restricted speech and not conduct; (2) the restricted speech was
content-based; and (3) the statute did not embody the least restrictive
means of serving North Carolina’s compelling interest in protecting
minors from harm; thus, the statute failed the strict scrutiny analysis.56
The court identified several problems with the cyber-bullying statute
that led it to its conclusion: the statute did not require the subject of
any online posts to experience actual harm,57 the requisite intent
(“intimidate” and “torment”) was too broad,58 and the description of

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 343.
55. State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 815 (N.C. 2016).
56. Id. “Strict scrutiny is a form of judicial review that courts use to determine the
constitutionality of certain laws. To pass strict scrutiny, the legislature must have passed the law
to further a ‘compelling governmental interest,’ and must have narrowly tailored the law to
achieve
that
interest.”
Strict
Scrutiny,
Wex
Legal
Dictionary
(2016),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
57. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 815.
58. Id. at 821.
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the conduct was too expansive.59 Although the court found the statute’s
purpose laudable, it ultimately held that the cyber-bullying statute had
“create[d] a criminal prohibition of alarming breadth.”60 The court
declared that the statute violated the First Amendment right to
freedom of speech, and thus reversed the court of appeals.61
III. ESTABLISHING A COMMON LAW BACKDROP TO CYBERBULLYING LEGISLATION
In light of the threats to free expression posed by content-based
restrictions, the Supreme Court of the United States has rejected a
“free-floating test for First Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad
hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits” as “startling and
dangerous.”62 But restrictions on speech have generally been permitted
when confined to the few “historic and traditional categories [of
expression] long familiar to the bar,” such as fighting words, obscenity,
incitement, and defamation.63 These categories have a historical
foundation in the Court’s free speech tradition.64 Adherence to these
established categories and rules allows the vast realm of protected
speech and free thought to thrive.65
Although the interest that North Carolina’s defunct cyber-bullying
statute meant to address—the protection of children from bullying—is
a compelling interest, the statute’s structure ran afoul of the First
Amendment by punishing content-based speech.66 The First
Amendment’s content-based speech discrimination doctrine examines
whether government action falls within the narrow range of situations
in which the freedom of speech can be overridden by the government’s
interest.67 The strict scrutiny analysis employed in Bishop seeks to limit
the government’s ability to suppress otherwise protected speech.68

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559
U.S. 460, 470 (2010)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 718.
66. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 822.
67. Id. at 819.
68. Id.
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In contrast, the categories the Supreme Court has recognized,
which include the dignitary torts of defamation (both libel and slander)
and IIED, address important and legitimate interests unrelated to the
suppression of protected speech and are compatible with the First
Amendment if properly constructed.69 If the North Carolina General
Assembly were to redraft a cyber-bullying bill, carefully framing the
issue of cyber-bullying in terms of dignitary torts and confinining the
definition within the constitutional boundaries developed by the
Supreme Court, then that bill could withstand a Bishop-like
constitutional challenge.
A. Supreme Court Considerations and Limitations
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court
assumed the task of resolving the conflict between states’ dignitary tort
law and the First Amendment’s freedom of speech.70 The Court’s
decisions display a meticulous consideration of the competing interests,
resulting in a nuanced balancing to determine whether tortious speech
is protected by the Constitution. The Court focused largely on two
factors—the nature of the plaintiff and the nature of the speech—in
reaching its conclusions.
1. Nature of the Plaintiff
The Supreme Court initially confronted the tension between the
First Amendment and tortious speech in the 1964 landmark case, New
York Times v. Sullivan.71 In New York Times, the Court established that
the First Amendment prevents a “public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice—that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not.”72
The Court has repeatedly upheld the New York Times definition of
“actual malice” when deciding defamation cases.73 Furthermore, it has
clarified that “actual malice” is a term of art, created to “provide a
69. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451
(2011).
70. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 279–80.
73. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 728 (1968); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 87
(1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1964).
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convenient shorthand expression for the standard of liability that must
be established before a State may constitutionally permit public
officials to recover for libel in actions brought against publishers”74 and
thus “should not be confused with the concept of malice as an evil
intent or a motive arising from spite or ill will.”75
The Court has held that “reckless disregard” within the meaning of
the New York Times rule can be measured by whether the publisher
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication and still
published with a “high degree of awareness of probable falsity.”76
However, the Court was careful to assert that “reckless disregard”
cannot be held to one infallible definition; its outer limits will be
defined on a case-by-case basis.77
Determination of a person’s status as a “public official” is a matter
of federal rather than state law.78 The Court has held that the “‘public
official’ designation applies at the very least to those among the
hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public
to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of
governmental affairs,”79 and that “the employee’s position must be one
which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding
it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the
particular charges in controversy.”80
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,81 the Court extended the New York
Times rule of “actual malice” to public figures who were not public
officials.82 In that case, the Court defined a “public figure” as one who
commands a substantial amount of public interest by his position alone,
or one who has thrust himself by purposeful activity into the vortex of
an important public controversy.83 Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,84 the Court held that a public figure within the New York Times

74. Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251 (1974).
75. Masson v. New Yorker Mag., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991).
76. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 730.
77. See id. (“[N]evertheless it is clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a
reasonably prudent person would have published, or would have investigated before publishing;
rather, there must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication.”).
78. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 84.
79. Id. at 85.
80. Id. at 86 n.13.
81. 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
82. Id. at 134.
83. Id. at 154–55.
84. 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
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rule to be either “an individual [who] may achieve such pervasive fame
or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all
contexts”85 or “an individual [who] voluntarily injects himself or is
drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a
public figure for a limited range of issues.”86 The Court noted that an
individual should not be deemed a public figure for all aspects of his or
her life without “clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the
community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society.”87
In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,88 the Court held that the First
Amendment precludes public figures and public officials from
recovering for an IIED claim unless they show that the publication
contains a false statement of fact which was made with “actual malice,”
as understood in the New York Times rule.89 It reasoned that a state’s
interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is not
sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech that is
offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury.90 However, the
Court did not eradicate IIED completely, even for public figures. The
tailored nature of its holding meant the Court left open the possibility
that a public figure could prevail on an IIED claim on a showing that
the defendant acted with actual malice. Furthermore, the Court said
nothing of private individuals succeeding in an IIED claim.
Ten years after New York Times, the Court examined the
constitutional limits on defamation suits brought by private
individuals.91 In Gertz, the Court held that “States may define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual.”92 However, because “the constitutional requirement of
fault supersedes the common law’s presumptions as to fault and
damages,”93 the Court mandated that States cannot impose liability
without fault.
Since New York Times, the Supreme Court has adapted and
extended its ruling that the First Amendment prohibits a public official
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 351.
Id.
Id. at 352.
485 U.S. 46 (1988).
Id. at 56.
Id. at 50.
See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1996).
Id. at 347.
See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986) (discussing Gertz).
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from recovering damages for a defamation claim absent “actual
malice.” In doing so, the Court has created a framework that stresses
the importance of the plaintiff’s status as a “public” person—either as
a “public official” or a “public figure”—versus a private individual. If
the plaintiff of a defamation suit falls within the “public” category of
persons, he or she cannot recover damages unless he or she can show
that the publication was made with “actual malice.” However, if the
plaintiff is a private individual, the Constitution only requires a level of
fault higher than strict liability to recover damages.
2. Nature of the Speech
A plurality of the justices clarified in Dun & Bradstreet v.
Greenmoss Builders94 that when a defamation suit involved not only a
private individual, but also speech of purely private concern, the
showing of “actual malice” was unnecessary.95 In doing so, the Court
effectively created a second measure by which to evaluate defamation’s
constitutional limitations.96 However, one can trace the Court’s
distinction back to Sullivan, in which the Court declared that
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on public issues is the
very essence of self-government and is a central purpose of the First
Amendment.97 Writing for the Court, Justice Powell expressed the view
that “speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First
Amendment concern,” because laws that restrict private speech pose
“no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no
potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning
self-government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of
self-censorship by the press.”98 The Court later affirmed the plurality’s
rule in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps,99 in which it further
articulated that, in defamation suits involving private individuals, but
also utterances of public concern, the plaintiff must bear the burden of
showing fault and falsity to recover damages.100

94. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
95. Id. at 753.
96. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270–74 (1964).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 760.
99. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
100. Id. at 776. The public concern in Hepps stemmed from a series of articles reporting that
a beverage-store chain and its principal stockholder had links to organized crime and used such
links to influence governmental decisions. Id.
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The Court most recently considered the nature of tortious speech
in Snyder v. Phelps,101 in which the father of a deceased marine brought
an IIED suit against the group protesting and picketing at his son’s
funeral.102 The Court stressed that its decisions as to whether Snyder
could recover damages for an IIED claim “turn[ed] largely on whether
that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the
circumstances of the case.”103 A matter of public concern, according to
the Court, is “any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest.”104 To
determine whether speech is a “matter of public concern,” the Court
looked to the content, form, and context of the statements.105 Because
the group was well known for picking military funerals to convey its
belief that God hates the United States for its acceptance of
homosexuality,106 especially in the military, the Court concluded that
the content of the speech related to the issues of interest to society at
large, and thus was protected by the First Amendment.107
Cases like Dun & Bradstreet and Snyder provide a second layer of
analysis for tortious speech. The Court’s rulings underscored the
importance of determining whether speech involves matters of public
or private concern when drawing lines at the crossroads of the First
Amendment and state common law. While “speech on public issues
occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values’
and is entitled to special protection,”108 speech concerning private
issues is not afforded such protection.
3. Current Framework
The case law up to this point suggests that courts should consider
the circumstances of each case when deciding a matter where state tort
law and First Amendment protection conflict. The Supreme Court has
primarily focused on two sets of factors resulting in four distinct
categories of circumstances: (1) Public figure-Public concern,109 (2)
101. 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
102. Id. at 443.
103. Id. at 444.
104. Id. (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 445–55.
107. Id. at 454. Justice Alito was the Court’s lone dissenter, writing that the Constitution did
not allow Westboro to “brutalize” the Snyder family with hateful messages even if they were in a
public setting. Id. at 463–75 (Alito, J., dissenting).
108. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759 (citations omitted).
109. See N.Y. Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 298–99 (1964).
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Public figure-Private concern,110 (3) Private individual-Public
concern,111 and (4) Private individual-Private concern.112
When the plaintiff is a public figure and the speech is of a public
concern, the law holds that the plaintiff must demonstrate “actual
malice” before he or she can recover damages under common law
defamation.113 When the plaintiff is a public figure, but the speech is not
of public concern, the courts also require the plaintiff demonstrate
“actual malice” to prevail, at least in an IIED claim.114 When the speech
is of public concern, but the plaintiff is a private figure, “the
Constitution still supplants the standards of the common law, but the
constitutional requirements are, in at least some of their range, less
forbidding.”115 Finally, when the plaintiff is a private individual and the
speech is of private concern, “the state interest in compensating private
individuals for injury to their reputation adequately supports awards of
presumed and punitive damages, even absent a showing of actual
malice,” in accordance with the state’s common law.116 This last
category is most analogous to Bishop and to typical instance of cyberbullying: the plaintiffs are private individuals and the speech is not a
legitimate matter of public concern. In these cases, the circumstances
most resemble Dun & Bradstreet, and thus the First Amendment only
compels states to apply a level of fault higher than strict liability to its
common law rules.
B. North Carolina’s Common Law
1. Libel
The common law applies with full force in North Carolina. Unless
modified or repealed by the General Assembly or the courts, the
“common law” is applied as it existed when North Carolina became a
state in 1776.117
North Carolina recognizes three classes of libel: (1) publications
that are obviously defamatory are called libel per se; (2) publications
110. The Supreme Court has not yet decided a case that fits this particular set of
circumstances.
111. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 463 (2011).
112. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 775.
113. See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. 254 at 279–80.
114. See Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
115. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986).
116. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 749.
117. Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988) (quoting Bruton v. Enters., Inc., 160 S.E.2d 482,
494 (1968)); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1986).
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that are susceptible of two interpretations, one of which is defamatory
and the other not; and (3) publications that are not obviously
defamatory, but when considered with innuendo, colloquium, and
explanatory circumstances, become libelous are called libels per
quod.118 In traditional common law, when an authorized publication is
libelous per se, damages are presumed from the fact of publication and
no proof is required as to any resulting injury.119
Publication includes any writing, printing, signs, or pictures which,
when considered alone without innuendo, colloquium or explanatory
circumstances: (1) charge that a person has committed an infamous
crime; (2) charge a person with having an infectious disease; (3) tend to
impeach a person in that person’s trade or profession; or (4) otherwise
tend to subject one to ridicule, contempt or disgrace.120 Otherwise put,
defamatory words must disgrace and degrade the party or hold him or
her up to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or cause him to be
shunned and avoided.121
In determining whether publications are susceptible to only one
defamatory meaning, the principle of common sense requires that
courts understand them as the average person would. The question
always is “how would ordinary men naturally understand the
publication.”122 The fact that “supersensitive persons with morbid
imaginations may be able, by reading between the lines of an article, to
discover some defamatory meaning therein is not sufficient to make
them libelous.”123
2. IIED
Under North Carolina law, the essential elements of an IIED claim
are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) which is intended to cause
and does cause (3) severe emotional distress.124
Whether conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support
an action for IIED is a question of law for the court.125 Extreme and
118. Renwick v. News & Observer Pub. Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 408 (N.C. 1984) (quoting Arnold
v. Sharpe, 251 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1979)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 409 (quoting Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 60 (N.C. 1938)).
121. Id.
122. Id. (citation omitted).
123. Id.
124. Rouse v. Duke Univ., 914 F. Supp. 2d 717, 728 (M.D.N.C. 2012), aff’d, 2013 WL 3828308
(4th Cir. 2012) (applying North Carolina Law).
125. Emmons v. Roses’s Stores, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d. 358, 365 (E.D.N.C. 1997), aff’d, 141 F.3d
1158 (4th Cir. 1998) (applying North Carolina law).
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outrageous conduct includes acts that “exceed all bounds usually
tolerated by a decent society.”126 In making this determination, courts
have noted that the foreseeability of injury, while not itself an element
of IIED, is a factor to consider when calculating the outrageousness of
the conduct.127
Intent to physically injure is not essential to satisfy a claim of IIED.
Therefore, the perpetrator of a practical joke is liable for a resulting
foreseeable injury.128 Additionally, IIED may be established when a
defendant’s actions indicate a reckless indifference to the likelihood
that they will cause severe emotional distress.129 For IIED, “severe
emotional distress means any type of severe and disabling emotional
or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed
by professionals trained to do so.”130 This means any “emotional or
mental disorder, such as . . . neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, [or]
phobia.”131 When considering if the resulting distress is severe, courts
have looked to the intensity and duration as factors.132
C. Libel and IIED Applied to Cyber-Bullying
Victims of school-related cyber-bullying are often private
individuals dealing with matters of private concern, and thus resemble
those in the Supreme Court’s tortious speech category that largely
defers to the common law rules for recovering damages. It follows that,
if cyber-bullying is sufficiently analogous to libel and IIED, victims of
cyber-bullying should be able to recover damages as well. Although
aspects of both libel and IIED can be found in acts of cyber-bullying,
the similarities do not necessarily make them the synonymous. Cyberbullying is a relatively new phenomenon, and thus any attempt to
analogize it with centuries-old common law torts deserves a thorough
analysis. Relating each element of the respective torts with the act of
cyber-bullying shows the comparison to be complicated.
Although North Carolina’s libel per se traditionally presumed a
defendant was acting with malice133—that is, the colloquial use of

126. Glenn v. Johnson 787 S.E.2d 65, 72 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).
127. Turner v. Thomas, 794 S.E.2d 439, 446 (N.C. 2016).
128. Langford v. Shu, 128 S.E.2d 210, 211–12 (N.C. 1962).
129. Turner, 794 S.E.2d at 446.
130. Mullis v. Mechanics & Farmers Bank, 994 F. Supp. 680, 689 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
131. Owens v. Dixie Motor Co., 2013 WL 3490395, at *4 (E.D.N.C. 2013).
132. Strickland v. Jewell, 562 F. Supp. 2d 661, 676 (M.D.N.C. 2007).
133. Renwick v. News & Observer Pub. Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 408 (N.C. 1984) (citations
omitted).
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“malice,” not the New York Times “actual malice” term of art—the
Dun & Bradstreet framework requires a level of fault higher than this
presumed strict liability even in cases concerning private plaintiffs and
private concerns. Thus, North Carolina’s common law libel per se must
adapt to allow express findings of malice.134 North Carolina’s IIED law,
by comparison, includes a heightened mens rea element, and thus, is
unaffected by the Supreme Court’s limitations in cases of private
plaintiffs and private concerns. At first glance, the “intent to cause
severe emotional distress” resembles both a general depiction of
bullying and the North Carolina statute’s “intent to intimidate or
torment.” However, after Bishop’s lawyers noted that the statute did
not define “intimidate” or “torment,”135 the State argued that the court
should define torment broadly to reference contact that annoyed,
pestered, or harassed.136 Not only does this definition fall far below
“intent to cause severe emotional distress” as it pertains to North
Carolina’s IIED law, but it undermines the actual severity of cyberbullying. Cyber-bullying encompasses a broad range of activity, but, to
withstand constitutional challenges, the law should err on the side of
punishing malicious intent to cause severe harm rather than attempting
to protect people from online annoyances.
Common law IIED encompasses a broad array of acts, so long as
they may be considered “extreme and outrageous conduct.” In
contrast, libel requires a publication, which, in today’s technological
landscape, includes various forms of internet activity. Moreover,
because society generally condemns bullying, it can be considered
extreme and outrageous conduct.137 Therefore, cyber-bullying as an act
can embody elements of both extreme and outrageous conduct and
publication.
Both IIED and libel seek to address particular harms caused by
such acts. Victims of libel are disgraced, ridiculed, and held in contempt
as a result of the preceding malicious publication. Victims of IIED have
suffered severe emotional distress as a result of conduct intended to

134. See Ellis v. Northern Star Co. 388 S.E.2d 127, 129 (N.C. 1990) (“We note at the outset
that, since the jury expressly found that the defendants acted with actual malice, this case does
not present the issue of whether damages may be presumed in libel per se actions absent a finding
of malice, as this Court has held in previous cases . . . . Certain cases decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States give rise to a question as to whether North Carolina can continue the
common law presumption of damages in libel per se actions absent express findings of malice.”).
135. State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 820–21 (N.C. 2016).
136. Id.
137. See Glenn v. Johnson, 787 S.E.2d 65, 72 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).
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cause such distress. The North Carolina statute, however, failed to
include any harm element whatsoever.138 The statute did not even
require the target of the cyber-bullying to be aware that the content
exists.139 This downplays the numerous tangible harms directly caused
by cyber-bullying, including mental and physical problems, decreased
academic achievement, increased anxiety and depression, changes in
eating and sleeping patterns, increased likelihood of skipping school or
dropping out, physical retaliation, and frequent suicidal thoughts or
actions.140 Moreover, to avoid potential due process challenges,
especially when attempting to address a broadly defined problem like
cyber-bullying, a statute must require harm to occur.141
The analogy is not perfect, but it does not have to be. The mens rea
of a civil tort for cyber-bullying may fall between libel’s “anything but
strict liability” requirement and IIED’s “intent to cause severe
emotional distress.” Cyber-bullying can take many forms, some of
which fit under IIED’s “extreme and outrageous conduct” definition,142
and many of which include libel’s “publication” definition. Most
importantly, cyber-bullying has the ability to cause the underlying
harms addressed by each tort: severe emotional distress, ridicule,
contempt, or disgrace. At the very least, because North Carolina can
address the underlying harms caused by cyber-bullying without
running afoul of the First Amendment, it should be able to legally
address the act of cyber-bullying in some meaningful way as well.
IV. THE CASE FOR CRIMINALIZING CYBER-BULLYING
North Carolina allows punitive damages in civil libel and IIED
lawsuits to punish offenders and to deter others from committing
similar offenses in the future.143 Many states, including North Carolina,
already criminalize similar non-physical harms such as stalking and

138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1 (2012).
139. Id.; see Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 820.
140. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 9.
141. Cf. State v. Packingham, 748 S.E.2d 146, 153 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (“Expansively written
laws designed to protect children are not exempt from the constitutional requirement of clarity
under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause.”).
142. Because “extreme and outrageous conduct” is any conduct deemed inexcusable by
society, and because society has universally condemned bullying, bullying falls under the
definition of “extreme and outrageous conduct” as it pertains to IIED. See Glenn, 787 S.E.2d at
72.
143. See Brian Timothy Beasley, North Carolina’s New Punitive Damages Statute: Who’s
Being Punished, Anyway?, 74 N.C. L. REV. 2174, 2175 (1996).
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harassing to deter these acts.144 Some of these statutes expressly include
online activity, while others have been later applied to online activity
in the absence of a cyber-bullying statute.145 While only a few examples
of criminal libel and IIED statutes exist, the drafters of the Model Penal
Code provide an argument in support of criminalizing those offenses.146
Accordingly, because cyber-bullying laws seek to punish and deter the
same harms as criminal libel and IIED do, states should be able to
directly criminalize cyber-bullying.
A. Insufficiency of Monetary Damages
The harms addressed in libel and IIED actions are similar to those
experienced by cyber-bullying victims.147 It follows that the means of
compensating victims of such harms should be similar as well. Although
the civil liability status of libel and IIED allow for a variety of monetary
damages, the particular status of cyber-bullying victims and cyberbullies themselves as minors leaves open the probability that monetary
damages will not effectively punish cyber-bullies nor deter cyberbullying.
North Carolina allows compensatory damages for plaintiffs in libel
and IIED cases.148 Compensatory damages include (1) pecuniary loss
direct or indirect, or special damages, (2) damages for physical pain and
inconvenience, (3) damages for mental suffering, and (4) damages for
injury to reputation.149 Additionally, the North Carolina legislature
authorized a trier of fact to award punitive damages in appropriate
cases to punish egregiously wrongful acts and to deter both the
defendant and others from committing such acts in the future.150
These rationales introduce a problem with respect to the parties
involved in cyber-bullying situations. When a tortfeasor is an adult, he
or she is liable, absent any established doctrines of vicarious liability.
This is not the same for a child tortfeasor. North Carolina law allows
144. See infra text accompanying notes 157–166.
145. See Brian S. Brazeau, The Transformation Of Indirect Harassment In The 21st Century:
Harassment Telephone Laws, Cyberbullying, And New Ways Of Analyzing First Amendment
Rights, 22 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 292 (2016–2017); George L. Blum, Validity,
Construction, and Application of State and Municipal Criminal and Civil Cyberbullying Laws, 26
A.L.R. Art. 4 (7th ed. 2017).
146. See infra text accompanying notes 173–175.
147. See infra Part I.
148. See, e.g., R. H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 154 S.E.2d 344, 353–54
(N.C. 1967); Wilson v. Pearce, 412 S.E.2d 148, 155 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
149. Hien Nguyen v. Taylor, 723 S.E.2d 551, 559 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
150. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-1 (1996).
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for injured persons to recover actual or nominal damages from the
parents of minors who act maliciously or willfully in some respects, but
the law is silent with respect to punitive damages.151
The purpose of assigning damages to parents is to compensate
innocent victims and to oblige parents to stop their child’s behavior.152
Another rationale for parental liability assumes that the parents’
inaction is the cause of the delinquency and thus the parent should be
punished for bad parenting.153 However, legal experts have raised
numerous issues with assigning parental liability for any malfeasance
resulting from a child’s unsupervised use of the internet.154 It is
unreasonable to expect, as technology becomes more engrained in
everyday life, that even a diligent parent will be able to monitor and
sufficiently curtail a child’s internet use. Courts recognized this long
before the prevalence of social networks, as it dealt with issues of
copyright infringement and access to pornographic websites.155
Furthermore, parenting is far from the only factor to a bully’s behavior.
Numerous studies show that socioeconomic status and biology can
contribute to the bullying mentality.156 Furthermore, punishing a parent
for a child’s bullying with monetary damages does not provide the
desired deterrence. The parent pays that price, which only indirectly
punishes the child, if the parent chooses to do so. Thus, punitive
monetary damages do not adequately punish or deter cyber-bullying.
Assigning criminal liability, however, remains another option.
B. Existing North Carolina Criminal Law
Several states have utilized their harassment and stalking laws to
combat cyber-bullying.157 North Carolina’s stalking law already
provides a definition of harassment that includes modern internet
technology:
Knowing conduct, including written or printed communication or
transmission, telephone, cellular, or other wireless telephonic
communication, facsimile transmission, pager messages or
151. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538.1 (2017).
152. See Amy L. Tomaszewski, From Columbine To Kazaa: Parental Liability In A New
World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 573, 579–80 (2005).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Justin W. Patchin & Sameer Hinduja, Bullies Move Beyond the Schoolyard A
Preliminary Look at Cyberbullying, 4 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 148, 150 (2006).
157. See Allison Lockhart, Online Harassment: Can Cyberbullying Laws Keep Up With
Technology? 16 PUB. INT. L. REP. 132 (2011).
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transmissions, answering machine or voice mail messages or
transmissions, and electronic mail messages or other computerized
or electronic transmissions directed at a specific person that
torments, terrorizes, or terrifies that person and that serves no
legitimate purpose.158

North Carolina also enacted a criminal cyber-stalking statute in
2001—long before social networks became commonplace, but well
after the establishment of the internet.159 The comprehensive statute
criminalized everything from installing tracking devices160 to
committing extortion over email.161 If North Carolina were to apply its
cyber-stalking statute to cyber-bullying, the section most relevant is
§(b)(2), which makes it unlawful to:
Electronically mail or electronically communicate to another
repeatedly, whether or not conversation ensues, for the purpose of
abusing, annoying, threatening, terrifying, harassing, or
embarrassing any person.162

In theory, these laws could provide adequate means to bring
charges against cyber-bullying activity. Unfortunately, this section may
not account for the indirect nature of most cyber-bullying offenses.163
The cyberstalking statute targets electronic transmissions directed at a
specific person or communicated to another.164 When Robert Bishop
posted his comments on Facebook, he was not directing them at Dillon
Price, but instead to his entire social network.165
Ultimately, these statutes were written to address direct
communication; they were not constructed for the world of social
networks. Harassment statutes could potentially cover direct cyberbullying, (i.e., cases in which the cyberbully communicates directly to
the victim). It would be more difficult, however, to apply these laws to
the indirect form of cyber-bullying in which the harassing
communications are posted in a “reasonably public area of cyberspace”
such as Facebook.166
158. Stalking, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3A (2015).
159. Cyberstalking, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196.3.
160. Id. § (a)(3).
161. Id. § (b)(1).
162. Id. § (b)(2).
163. The use of “repeatedly” indicates that the recipient of the excessive communication is
the protected target, while the use of “any person” suggests that the statute is more focused on
the act itself.
164. Id.
165. State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 815 (N.C. 2016).
166. Susan W. Brenner, ‘Kiddie Crime?’ The Utility of Criminal Law in Controlling
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C. Criminal law’s Normative and Representative Influence
While North Carolina is not alone in limiting libel and IIED to the
world of civil law, criminalizing libel and IIED could serve North
Carolina’s legitimate interest in eradicating cyber-bullying. The status
of defamation in the criminal law has ebbed and flowed over the
centuries, adapting to changes in both public perception and
technological realities.
In the early seventeenth century, the English Court of Star
Chamber assumed the responsibility for controlling speech.167 The
court developed four separate criminal offenses under the rule of
criminal libel: seditious libel, blasphemy, obscenity, and defamation.168
Defamation covered comments directed toward an individual on the
theory that “they tend[ed] to create breaches of the peace when the
defamed . . . undert[ook] to revenge themselves on the defamer.”169
English colonists brought to the New World the understanding that
criminal libel threatened social order, not just the individual.170 It was
therefore enforced more stringently than civil libel; truth was not a
defense.171 This conception of criminal libel has rarely been used in
American courts. A quantitative study shows that the number of
criminal libel cases has steadily declined since the turn of the twentieth
century.172 The drafters of the Model Penal Code cited this decline as a
factor in deciding “one of the hardest questions” they confronted in
choosing whether to retain a crime of defamation.173 The drafters
explained that although “willful public defamation of an individual can
be a traumatic experience which deserves to be taken . . . seriously,”174

Cyberbullying, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 31. (2009).
This aspect of indirect cyberbullying gives rise to two issues, neither of which arises with
direct cyberbullying: (1) to what extent did the cyberbully intentionally direct the online
communication(s) at the victim; and (2) to what extent did he or she intend the
communication(s) to be seen by others whose reactions were likely to have a negative
impact on the victim?
Id.
167. Susan W. Brenner, Symposium: Prosecution Responses To Internet Victimization:
Should Online Defamation Be Criminalized?, 76 MISS. L.J. 705, 713 (2007).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Marc A. Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a Defense
in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 791–92 (1964).
172. Gregory C. Lisby, No Place in the Law: The Ignominy of Criminal Libel in American
Jurisprudence, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 433, 466–67 (2004).
173. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.7 cmt. at 44 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 13, 1961).
174. Id. at 45.
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the likelihood of such situations occurring, given the media landscape
at the time, was not enough to justify criminalizing defamation.175
Neither the English colonists nor the Model Penal Code drafters
could have foreseen the monumental change in the publication
landscape brought forth by the internet. At the time the Model Penal
Code was drafted, avenues of publication consisted of a limited set of
professionalized media: radio, network television, and print media.176
These organizations had both the professional standards to avoid
irresponsible defamation and the financial ability to provide adequate
damages when they were liable.177 Moreover, the commercial nature of
publication resulted in stories and articles that focused on matters of
public concern that would attract a large audience.178 The media
industry of the 1960s thus had an economic reason to police itself and
exercise a fair amount of control to avoid libel and slander suits.
Operating under this reality, the drafters saw no reason to include any
form of criminal defamation in the Model Penal Code.
The democratization of online publication has changed many of the
assumptions on which the Model Penal Code drafters based their
decision to omit criminal defamation. Anyone with internet access can
become a publisher. As such, publishers are no longer required to
engage in professional vetting procedures to ensure accuracy of the
published material.179 Because publishing is no longer confined to large
media organizations, there is no guarantee that one who commits
defamation could adequately compensate a victim with civil damages.
Collectively, the current model of publishing differs significantly from
the model on which the Model Penal Code drafters relied. Thus, the
reason cited by the drafters for omitting criminal defamation is no
longer dispositive.

175. See id. at 44. (“[O]ur alarm may, as in the case of petty theft or malicious mischief, derive
from the higher likelihood that such lesser harms will be inflicted upon us by those who manifest
disregard of other people’s ownership. It seems evident that personal calumny” does not fall in
this class, and is therefore “inappropriate for penal control.”).
176. Todd Leopold, TV in 1960s vs today: Times have changed, right?, CNN (Aug. 25, 2014)
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/29/showbiz/tv/sixties-television-then-now/index.html.
177. Quint Randle, A Historical Overview of the Effects of New Mass Media Introductions on
Magazine Publishing During the Twentieth Century, 6 FIRST MONDAY 9 (2001) http://first
monday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/885/794.
178. Id.
179. Martin Belam, Journalism in the digital age: trends, tools and technologies, THE
GUARDIAN, Apr. 14, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/help/insideguardian/2010/apr/14/
journalism-trends-tools-technologies.
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Despite the drafters’ omission, twenty-three states criminalize
some form of libel.180 These state statutes focus either on preventing “a
breach of the peace”181 or preventing an “impeach[ment] [of] the
honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation” of a person.182 Alabama, for
example, enacted a libel law in the mid-nineteenth century that still
exists today:
Any person who publishes a libel of another which may tend to
provoke a breach of the peace shall be punished, on conviction, by
fine and imprisonment in the county jail, or hard labor for the
county; the fine not to exceed in any case $500.00 and the
imprisonment or hard labor not to exceed six months.183

North Carolina’s sole criminal libel law, however, punishes only
those who give libelous information concerning any person or
corporation to a newspaper or periodical, if the newspaper publishes
it.184
The status of a law is not considered in a vacuum. Societal views,
technological limitations, and the development of Supreme Court
doctrine have all influenced the status of libel laws. Defamation, both
as libel and slander, has a complex history in common law. Following
the New York Times decision and the Model Penal Code’s omission,
defamation’s prevalence in both civil and criminal law declined. Many
states have no form of criminal defamation, and those that do provide
different rationales for its criminal status. Some states frame the law in
terms of maintaining a peaceful society, while others stress the desire
to prevent harm to the individual. This complex history demonstrates
the role that external factors play in affecting law. The rise of cyberbullying is one such factor, and thus, society has reacted by demanding
legislation.
V. CRAFTING A NEW CYBER-BULLYING STATUTE
The Bishop decision struck down North Carolina’s cyber-bullying
statute on First Amendment grounds; specifically, its broad language
failed to reach the narrowest means of protecting children from cyber180. See Lisby, supra note 172, at 479–81.
181. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-160 (1975); VA. CODE. § 18.2-417 (2009).
182. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4801 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.765(1)
(West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212(1) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:11(1)
(LexisNexis 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-01(1) (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 771
(West 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-404(1) (2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 42.01(2) (West 2005).
183. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-160 (1975).
184. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-47 (1994).
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bullying.185 The statute was entirely content-based, containing a list of
several forms of expression that were prohibited if done “with the
intent to torment a minor.”186
If North Carolina were to draft a new statute—one that would
survive a constitutional challenge—the statute must reframe the issue
in terms of the harm that cyber-bullying causes. By doing so, the law
would find roots in traditionally unprotected forms of expression such
as defamation and IIED instead of listing various forms of online
activity, thus avoiding the problems discussed by the Bishop court.187
Instead, by expressing the law in terms of tortious speech, the statute
would fall within the New York Times’ “private individual-private
concern” category, further minimizing potential constitutional issues.
Furthermore, the statute could tether its mens rea component to those
specific harms, thus satisfying any vagueness challenge as expressed by
the Bishop court.188 A bill for such a statute may resemble the
following:
AN ACT PROTECTING CHILDREN OF THIS STATE BY
MAKING CYBERBULLYING A CRIMINAL OFFENSE
PUNISHABLE AS A MISDEMEANOR.
<< N.C.G.S. § 14–196.4 >>
SECTION 1. This Act shall be known as the Cyber-bullying
Prevention Act.
SECTION 2. The purpose of this Act is to protect children from the
psychological, social, emotional, and physical harms caused by cyberbullying. This Act incorporates and punishes the underlying harms
addressed by common law defamation and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, as enforced in N.C.G.S. § 4-1.
SECTION 3. Nothing in this Act is intended to interfere with the
First Amendment rights of free speech and expression of any person
affected.

185.
186.
187.
188.

State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 817 (N.C. 2016).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1(a)(1) (2012).
Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 821.
Id.
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SECTION 4. Article 26 of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes is
amended by adding a new section to read:
§ 14–196.4. Cyber-bullying; penalty
(a) The following definitions apply in this section:
(1) Cyber-bullying.—an act or acts exhibited by one person or
group of people to a minor or group of minors through any
form of electronic communication that:
a. with the intent to cause such harm:
1. endangers the psychological, emotional, or
physical health of a minor, including, but not limited to,
causing fear, anxiety, depression, neurosis, phobia,
paranoia, or any other type of severe and disabling
emotional or mental condition that may be generally
recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to
do so;
2. misleads a person or group of people in order to
harass a minor, substantially disgrace and degrade a
minor, subject a minor to public hatred, hostility,
contempt or ridicule, or cause a minor to be shunned
and avoided; or
3. otherwise bullies or harasses a minor, as described
in § 115C-407.15.
(2) Electronic communication.—any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic
system, photo-electronic system, or photo-optical system, or
other transmission or medium such as electronic mail, text
messaging, instant messaging, social media, internet
communications, or facsimile communications.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to use any form of electronic
communication to engage in any act of cyber-bullying:
(1) in which the victim subjectively views the conduct as cyberbullying; and
(2) the conduct is objectively severe or pervasive enough that a
reasonable person would agree that it is cyber-bullying.
(c) Any person who violates this section shall be guilty of cyberbullying, which shall be punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor if the
defendant is 18 years of age or older at the time the offense is

MCGUIRE READY FOR ISSUE (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

PRESERVING THE ‘JEWEL OF THEIR SOULS’

2/5/2018 4:06 PM

83

committed. If the defendant is under the age of 18 at the time the
offense is committed, the offense shall be punishable as a Class 2
misdemeanor.
SECTION 5. This act becomes effective upon enactment, and
applies to offenses committed on or after that date.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cyber-bullying is a serious and recurrent problem that harms
children. The increased access and growing dependence on electronic
communication and online social networks give cyber-bullies more
avenues to inflict harm on their victims. North Carolina’s valiant effort
to address this phenomenon fell short after the ruling in State v. Bishop.
The statute was flawed, and the court held that it infringed upon the
First Amendment.
A statute crafted with more care could achieve the same goal while
avoiding any constitutional limitations. North Carolina’s robust
common law can offer a source of relief for victims of cyber-bullying.
The torts of libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress seek to
remedy psychological and dignitary harms like those experienced by
cyber-bullying victims. By navigating the Supreme Court’s intersection
of the First Amendment and such harmful speech, North Carolina can
impose civil liability, including punitive damages, using its common law
torts. However, if the legislature wants to reflect the views of society
and prevent cyber-bullying instead of compensating for it indirectly
through parental liability, the legislature should turn to the criminal law.
Whether the legislature expands existing harassment law, incorporates
the common law torts into the criminal law, or redrafts a cyber-bullying
statute that complies with the First Amendment, criminalizing cyberbullying is both constitutional and a fervent societal condemnation of
bullying in the twenty-first century.

